Cases 8/11/08

People v. Curry, No. 4-06-0355 (4th Dist. 7/28/08)

Defendant was found guilty of armed robbery by a jury.


At sentencing the court sentenced defendant to natural life under the Habitual Criminal Act.  They based the sentence on certified copies of two prior armed robbery convictions which occurred five years apart separated by imprisonment.


“Because prior convictions for Class X offenses can be conclusively be determined as temporally separate from the records, sentence as habitual offender need not be based on explicit jury finding.”


Therefore, Habitual is not an Apprendi issue where certified convictions can state the dates of offense.

U.S. v. Stewart, No. 06-4323 (7th Cir. 8/4/08)

At a trial on bank robbery and related gun charges the Federal District Court acted appropriately when it admitted the videotaped confession even though it was obtained after defendant made initial statement that prior to Miranda warning.

The court properly found that the officer did not engaged in an improper two-step interrogation process found objectionable in Seibert because the officer held subjective belief that defendant was not in custody at the time he gave the un-Mirandized statement.

This might seem to conflict with the Illinois Supreme Court decision in People v. Lopez, (No. 103768, 6/19/08) which I sent out last week, but the distinction is in the details.  Apparently the court has to determine if the officer is intentionally engaging in the “improper two-step interrogation” based on the facts involved.

What is concerning is that in this case the officer’s state of mind regarding the custodial status of the defendant was used in the determination.  Here, the officer believed the defendant was not in custody for the first statement, so it was ok.

U.S. v. Broadnax, No. 07-1985 (7th Cir.8/4/08)
Defendant waived speedy issue by waiting until after conclusion of the prosecution case in chief to file his motion to dismiss.

Section 3162(a)(2) of the federal Speedy Act says waiting until case begins is a specific waiver of a motion to dismiss issue.

People v. Lemke, No. 5-07-0064 (5th District 7/31/08)

Defendant was engaged in a fight with victim then “went inside” and got a gun, returned and shot the victim.

This was sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict for murder, despite presentation of evidence of combined use of alcohol and Xanax and claim of unanticipated side effects.

This relates to People v. Alberts (4th Dist. 2008) (No. 4-07-0582, 6/26/08) from my last missive, which took the People v. Hari, 218 Ill.2d 275, 843 N.E.2d 349 (2006) decision (which allowed the involuntary intoxication defense to include an unexpected adverse reaction to a drug taken on doctor’s orders) and applied it to cases on collateral review.

U.S. v. Henderson, No. 07-1014 (7th Cir. 8/6/08).

Court erred by granting motion to suppress fruit of warrantless search of defendant’s home where:

1.       Defendant had earlier objected to police presence in home;

2.      Search was conducted when police obtained consent from his wife;

3.      Where that consent came after defendant had been validly arrested on unrelated charge.

This distinguishes the US Supreme Court case that says that in a situation where owner says yes and one says no, there is no proper consent for warrantless search.

Explore posts in the same categories: Crime, crime and punishment, Law

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